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While the Theory Wars are seen to have had a huge impact on English (among other disciplines) 
in the latter part of the twentieth century, children’s literature studies is often depicted as free of 
such internecine battles. However, there was a period, beginning in the 1980s with Jacqueline 
Rose’s The Case of Peter Pan, or the Impossibility of Children’s Fiction (1984), that many 
children’s literature critics felt obliged to tackle poststructuralist ideas, whether it was to reject 
them (and be labelled “liberal humanists”) or accept them (as did the Reading critics). This 
article reconsiders this contentious period, seeking to go beyond the often acerbic rhetoric and, as 
a result, argues that, in lumping together these poststructuralist critics, important differences in 
their positions have been lost. This article re-examines the period and assesses the legacy that has 
been inherited.  
Keywords: Poststructuralism. Jacques Derrida; Jacques Lacan; Karín Lesnik-Oberstein; 
Jacqueline Rose. 
 
… in Italy, for thirty years under the Borgias, they had warfare, terror, murder and 
bloodshed, but they produced Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci and the Renaissance. In 
Switzerland, they had brotherly love, they had five hundred years of democracy and 
peace – and what did that produce? The cuckoo clock. (The Third Man, 1949) 
I have begun this article with the renowned Third Man quotation because, during the famous 
“theory wars,” which were fought most fiercely by the big powers at a time when 
poststructuralism was in the ascendant (1970s-80s), children’s literature studies was often seen to 
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be in the position of Switzerland: a cozy and pacific enclave. However, although often forgotten 
about today, the discipline did have its own, lesser engagement in these skirmishes, which can be 
traced back to Jacqueline Rose’s first monograph, The Case of Peter Pan, or the Impossibility of 
Children’s Fiction (1984). The military metaphors were certainly in place shortly thereafter, with 
Brian Alderson, in an early review of Rose’s work, terming it “a fairly good example of the 
fairly recent incursion of the troops of Academe among the humble tents of children’s literature. 
The invaders have undertaken their most frequent manoeuvres upon the campuses of North 
American universities…” (296). Strangely, this representative of the liberal humanist position 
doesn’t point out that the invader was an English Rose, with more of British Academe to follow. 
It seems apposite to revisit this period in the development of children’s literature studies for 
several reasons. First, because, as noted above, the disagreements have largely been superseded, 
the last salvoes probably occurring with the publication of Marah Gubar’s Artful Dodgers and 
Perry Nodelman’s The Hidden Adult (both 2008), followed, in 2010, by a special issue of 
Children’s Literature Association Quarterly’s marking the 25th anniversary of Rose’s work. 
Jerry Griswold’s contemporaneous blog, entitled “Marah Gubar Vs. the Jacqueline Rose Cult 
(and Coda),” certainly has the finality of an epitaph.  
A second reason for revisiting this feud is that, at the time, the substantive issues often went 
untouched, their place being taken by intemperate invective. Griswold’s talk of “Rose and her 
righteous acolytes,” who “spawned a Cult of Neo-Puritans,” is indicative. It is a key aim of this 
article to spell out the theoretical grounds of difference and, in particular, to show that Rose and 
those who became known as the “Reading critics,” led by Karín Lesnik-Oberstein, were not as 
concordant as is often claimed. And, finally, mention of this critic also brings to mind the fact 
that it is now 25 years since the publication of her seminal monograph, Children’s Literature: 
Criticism and the Fictional Child (194). 
Before becoming embroiled in this territorial altercation, though, it is important to establish the 
terrain over which these wars have been fought, and, indeed, what we even mean by terms like 
“theory” and “war,” especially when they become bedfellows. 
Theorizing – Let Me Count the Ways 
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First, then, what is theory? One could say that to ask this question is already to be engaged in 
theory, for the word derives from the Greek for “seeing,” and hovers between that initial visual 
experience and a more metaphorical reflection (“I see”). It is a recognition that is captured in the 
customary words of Rashid from Salman Rushdie’s Haroun and the Sea of Stories: that there is 
often “more … than meets the blinking eye” to things (19). Notably, the word “theory” is linked 
to “theatre,” which involves framing some aspect of the world (including human behavior) in 
order to reflect upon it. In staging something, then, one takes it out of context, allows it to stand 
apart, spot-lit – or, as I’ve done above, placed it in scare quotes (Rudd, Theory).  
The etymological roots of the word “war” are also instructive, being linked to terms like 
“confusion,” “quarrel” and, indeed, with “turning” (Latin versus or “Vs.”). Once again, there is 
the notion of re-examining something written or said, re-turning and reframing it in order to 
rectify any misunderstandings. Seen in this light, warring also can be a positive practice, as 
William Blake declares: “Without Contraries is no progression” (The Marriage, 149). Hence, 
when Lesnik-Oberstein characterizes children’s literature studies as deficient in that its critics 
“disagree amongst themselves” (Children’s Literature, 7), others might see this as a strength. 
Here, it will be argued that disagreements become unproductive only when they are divorced 
from concrete issues. For, if we go back to the mid-sixties, when theory first becomes more overt 
in literary studies, it was then linked to particular social groups – the working class, women, 
Blacks, children even – and was often articulated in Marxist terms. But over time, many of these 
interest groups were left behind as the conceptual superstructure of theory became increasingly 
grand (“high theory”), eventually collapsing under its own weight, and often crushing primary 
texts in the process (the massive Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism [Leitch], now in its 
third edition, approaches 3,000 pages, few of which engage with primary texts).  
It is significant that the word “Theory” itself becomes elevated over these decades, often sporting 
a capital letter, and appearing unqualified, detached from any particular discipline. Even more 
significantly, some of its proponents would argue that theory needed no substantive basis, in that 
the world was composed of nothing but its various inscriptions, despite – as others objected – the 
persistence of material inequalities and abuses. It was hardly surprising that the critical artillery 
increasingly turned on the high theorists themselves, both within the academy (e.g. Peter 
Washington’s Fraud; Valentine Cunningham’s Reading after Theory) and, more damningly, 
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outside it, with such unfortunate epitaphs as the “exposé” of the deconstructionist Paul de Man 
(Lehman) and the “Sokal Hoax.” The latter episode involved a paper, published in the 
prestigious cultural studies journal, Social Text, that was subsequently discovered to be a parody 
of theorizing, emptily deploying arcane terminology. It was a clear case of the “Emperor’s New 
Clothes,” which is exactly how Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont presented it (2), though the 
article’s American title, “Fashionable Nonsense,” was even more damning. It was certainly a 
clarion call to all, not only to be intelligible but also to recognize that there is always more to 
discourse than mere discourse. Such exposés aside, it needs emphasizing that cultural studies 
was by no means exceptional in publishing suspect material: the hard sciences have a long and 
colorful history of such practices (e.g. Broad and Wade).  
Theory at War 
Of course, there had been earlier disputes. The tents of children’s literature were never as humble 
as Alderson makes out, especially when it came to the nature of the child, which has always been 
the central issue: is this particular being distinct in some intrinsic way? Innately sinful, perhaps, 
as the Puritans argued, or innocent – as Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued – until, that is, corrupted 
by society. Was fantasy, therefore, a suitable vehicle for children’s literature, as the largely male 
Romantic writers purported, or should it be rejected, as the contemporaneous women 
educationalists contended, a group infamously damned as “that curs’d Barbauld crew” by 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge? 
Such debates run through the history of the discipline, being popularly reconceptualized in the 
1970s by John Rowe Townsend, a children’s author and critic, who distinguished Book People 
from Child People, which, at the time, resulted in a drawing up of “battle lines …behind 
banners” (Barnes). The former group might be characterized by pronouncements like the 
following, from the cultural critic, Fred Inglis: “Tom’s Midnight Garden and Puck of Pook’s Hill 
are wonderful books whoever you are, and that judgement stands whether or not your child can 
make head or tail of them” (Promise, 7). Critics could thereby concentrate on a book’s language, 
imagery, characters and themes, treating the assignation “children’s fiction” as little more than a 
description of the genre.  
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In contrast, Child People saw the intended audience in more concrete terms, children having their 
own valid judgements on texts. Child People tended to react against such older notions of 
“Literature” with a capital “L,” which were recognized as elitist, largely ignoring large swathes 
of the population: women, people of color, the disabled – and children too. The new social 
critics, of which Townsend was one, therefore argued for a more inclusive approach to criticism, 
one that was more aware of gender, race, class and of the child as a social being (e.g. Dixon, 
Catching Them Young; Leeson, Reading and Righting). Again, theory was responsive, with 
Marxism, feminism, and race studies providing rich resources, let alone more general 
psychoanalytical (e.g. Bettelheim; Franz) and developmental studies, the latter often drawing on 
the work of Jean Piaget (e.g. Schlager; Tucker).  
However, the period of the Theory Wars marked a more distinct change in emphasis, in that 
poststructuralism’s “linguistic turn” (a “turning” or “versus”) brought a heightened awareness of 
language as not merely a medium for speaking about the world but, beyond that, as constitutive 
of that world to some extent. Those last three words are, in my opinion, crucial, in that the 
dialectic interplay between language and its material substrate is maintained; and many critics, 
although influenced by poststructuralist ideas, were committed to this belief in an extra-textual 
reality (e.g. Belsey, Derrida, Eagleton, Jameson, Lacan, Said), thus preserving at least a residual 
place for agency or empowerment. In contrast, others were committed to rejecting what they saw 
as any trace of humanism (e.g. Butler, Foucault, Rorty, Stainton Rogers and Stainton Rogers). 
In this paper, I shall argue two main points. First that, as the above indicates, it is a mistake to 
see poststructuralism as possessing some theoretical orthodoxy; or, more bluntly, that the Theory 
Wars simply pitted poststructuralism against humanism.1 The literature shows that this is an 
oversimplification resulting from the way each side constructed a stereotype of the other, causing 
adversaries to tilt at “straw men” without paying sufficient attention to the premises on which 
particular viewpoints were founded. Productive differences were, thereby, frequently elided – 
one of the main ones being, as we shall see, between Rose and the Reading critics.  
Second and, again, as hinted above, it will be argued that theory, being a way of framing some 
aspect of the world, always needs something of that world within its purview. This is what the 
dialectic provides, giving theory some material purchase, and it explains why theory is better 
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enacted with verbs (theorizing) than nouns, the latter all too frequently ossifying into fixed 
positions with their respective camps, tents and champions.  
Before I proceed, though, I should declare to being more than a war correspondent myself, 
having frequently been in the firing line (e.g. “The constructed child in Rudd’s reading is merely 
a shifting notion that exists on top of the indisputable and immutable ‘real’” – Neil Cocks, 112) 
and been guilty of a few sorties myself (e.g. “Children’s Literature,” “Theories and Theorising”).  
 
The Case of Rose 
Rose threw down a tantalizing gauntlet: “If children's fiction builds an image of the child inside 
the book, it does so in order to secure the child who is outside the book, the one who does not 
come so easily within its grasp” (2). The phrase “children’s fiction,” in other words, was seen to 
be disingenuous, espousing the simplicity we find in such phrases as “children’s drawings,” 
where children do, indeed, have ownership of their productions. But with their fiction, children’s 
supposed subjectivity is engineered by adults. Children’s fiction, then, “hangs on an 
impossibility,” Rose argued; namely, “it represents the child, speaks to and for children, 
addresses them as a group which is knowable and exists for the book, much as the book …exists 
for them” (1). 
 
It has to be said that many of Rose’s early critics simply did not understand her argument. They 
pointed to the range of available children’s books, or to the diversity of child characters within 
these books, as though these claims themselves refuted her case about children’s literature being 
“impossible.” Rose’s point, though, as noted above, is that the children in the phrase children’s 
fiction, and the child readers implied by such texts, are the constructions of adults. But even 
more significant for Rose is the fact that adults and children are, ontologically speaking, in the 
same boat; that is, we are, none of us, rational, coherent individuals; we are, rather, fractured by 
unconscious pressures that undo our sense of mastery: over language, over a coherent sense of 
identity, over our sexuality and, even, our place in the world. Children’s fiction, then, is only 
different in that it is a space where such rifts are disavowed, where a far simpler, more coherent 
vision of the world (and our place within it) is presented. As Rose puts it, “The child and the 
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adult are one at that point of pure identity which the best of children’s books somehow manage 
to retrieve” (5). 
What is perhaps most curious about Rose’s case, though, especially given her involvement with 
Lacanian psychoanalysis (Lacan, Feminine Sexuality), is how muted is this thinker’s presence in 
her book on children’s fiction. Only once, in a footnote, is Lacan overtly named (153) – not even 
receiving an index entry – despite the fact that his concepts underpin Rose’s repeated cry, “We 
have been reading the wrong Freud to children” (12-13). 
This said, a more overt Lacanianism would have made the tensions in Rose’s case more 
problematic, for she has given the child a double sense of dislocation. The first derives from 
Lacan’s notion of the shift from the Imaginary into the Symbolic; that is, from that time when the 
child experiences a false or fictional sense of wholeness (an ego), either from seeing its mirror 
image, or from its caregiver’s eulogizing. This dyad’s idealized, or “imaginary” relationship, 
however, is shattered when the child is forced to recognize the father: to accept the law of 
patriarchy, of language (the Symbolic). Former images of wholeness are then sliced up into 
empty signifiers, making the child itself a “subject” of language. Thereafter, the child will be 
driven by a desire to restore that former wholeness – which, indeed, adults will try to recapture in 
their figuration of the (Romantic) child.  
Rose, however, complicates this Lacanian model by suggesting that children’s fiction produces a 
further sense of dislocation: “the very constitution of the adult as a subject … the adult then 
repeats through the book which he or she gives to the child” (141). It is indeed strange that 
Lacan’s notion of development proceeding in a fictional direction (through the creation of the 
ego) is doubled by children’s fiction itself, particularly when Rose makes the claim that this 
second displacement requires the child to give up “its own process” (2), as though this hadn’t 
already occurred upon entry into the Symbolic. Had Rose pursued a more Marxist line she could 
have argued, following Louis Althusser and others, that the various Ideological State 
Apparatuses (ISAs – e.g. education, welfare and the family) played their part in constructing the 
subject and ensuring its compliance. But she does not, choosing instead to see children’s books 
as special and, thereby, almost uniquely “impossible” (142). 
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The final point to make about Rose’s modified Lacanian position is that, although she sees the 
child as a constructed being (as is the adult, qua human), she does not thereby deny what Sue 
Walsh, one of the Reading critics, terms “the pre- or extra-discursive existence of a ‘real’ child” 
(Kipling, 38). For Rose, the Lacanian child exists within three orders (two of which emerge 
developmentally, as noted above), and the third, the “Real,” marks where we all start, as 
creatures with biological needs (Lesnik-Oberstein seems to have this material being in mind 
when she refers unproblematically to the crying of “new-born” babies – see below). Rose is quite 
explicit about this distinction between the “real” child and the child as figured, noting how the 
latter “conceals all the historical divisions and difficulties of which children, no less than 
ourselves, form a part” (161). This distinction is crucial, actual children being the ones with their 
“own process,” who don’t “come so easily within [a book’s] grasp.”2  
I have spelt out Rose’s position in some detail (she, like Lacan – and indeed Derrida – dislikes 
the label “poststructuralist”) in order that her theoretical distance from the Reading critics, who 
were more influenced by Derrida, can be more clearly discerned. For Rose, then, it is “children’s 
fiction” only that is impossible, not the child itself, contrary to the Reading critics’ attempt to 
infer a logical connection between their respective positions; namely, that Rose “closes down the 
field of children’s fiction and therefore, by implication, children’s literature criticism, by 
questioning the status of the ‘existence’ of the child” (Lesnik-Oberstein, Children’s Literature, 
159). It is by ignoring this distinction that the Reading critics can seek to undermine children’s 
literature criticism for its obsession, as they see it, with a “real child.” In the next section, then, I 
will try to tease out the basis of the Reading critics’ work, which is more overtly rooted in 
Derridean deconstruction. 
The “Reading Critics” 
An anonymous reader of this chapter suggested that, as this group’s work was not particularly 
well-known outside the UK, a more formal introduction to them might be useful. So, it perhaps 
needs stating that the phrase, “Reading critics,” does not designate some group with special 
hermeneutic prowess. “Reading” here rhymes not with “weeding” but “wedding,” and refers to 
the critics’ institutional affiliation, CIRCL – to give it its official name, at the University of 
Reading (http://www.circl.co.uk/) – directed by Lesnik-Oberstein, and also featuring Walsh and 
Cocks, both former research students there (Stephen Thomson, also once an active member, 
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withdrew some years ago). While it might seem invidious to ignore their individual voices, their 
tendency to publish as a collective, and to view the fact that “critics disagree amongst 
themselves” (Children’s Literature, 7) in negative, rather than positive terms, does make them 
prime examples of what Stanley Fish designates as an “interpretive community,” espousing a 
seemingly homogenous, self-referential outlook (Griswold’s term is “acolytes”) – though, as I 
shall later argue, there are some productive tensions. 
The phrase “Reading critics” was, in fact, coined by Perry Nodelman, who first reviewed Lesnik-
Oberstein’s monograph under the title “Hatchet Job,” which perhaps established a tone that was, 
in turn, reciprocated, such that he was later to complain about three of these Reading scholars, 
across separate essays, repeating the same objections to a single sentence from his oeuvre. “In 
turn,” Nodelman accused them of “attempted massacres … reminiscent … of the Bush view of 
international relations: ‘Either you’re with us or you’re with the terrorists’…” (“Precarious Life,” 
3, quoting Judith Butler). The mention of Bush not only dates the dispute but is again indicative 
of the military imagery that was so regularly deployed. 
More importantly, Nodelman’s gripe goes to the essence of the group’s supposedly Derridean 
stance in that, whereas Nodelman himself sought to distinguish “real children” (“Precarious,” 5) 
from those figured in discourse (as does Rose, above), the Reading critics repeatedly assert that 
“the child does not exist” (Lesnik-Oberstein, Children’s Literature, 9). Their point is that phrases 
like the “‘real child’” (13) are themselves textual constructions only, recalling Derrida’s 
infamous pronouncement that “there is nothing outside the text” (Of Grammatology, 158). So, 
one can never reach beyond that signifier, “child,” to some essential being, since, when one uses 
the word, some prior categorization has already taken place, distinguishing the “child” from the 
“not-child” (or “adult”). It is on such a basis that Lesnik-Oberstein dismisses Townsend’s 
distinction between Book and Child people, arguing that “both … are ‘child people’ … relying 
on the existence of the ‘real’ child” (102). Following this logic, the Reading critics might more 
straightforwardly be described as “textual people.” 
 
They make a powerful point, and one not to be belittled (as much criticism has attempted to do). 
But I would argue that they read Derrida himself in rather restrictive, constructionist terms, 
resulting in a particularly futile form of theory war in which, in the manner of Where’s Wally? 
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(Handford),3 criticism frequently devolved into the scouring of critical works for sightings of this 
“real child,” which, once spotted, resulted in the wholesale dismissal of the offending piece 
(hence, again, Griswold’s reference to “rooting out heretics”). Starting with Lesnik-Oberstein’s 
work, then, I shall seek to show a more complicated picture, one in which the distance between 
Rose and the Reading critics is more visible, and where the latter emerge as not totally in 
agreement (which, I would contend, is itself productive).  
 
Lesnik-Oberstein, in her single monograph based on her PhD, is certainly less strident than later 
Reading voices but, as a consequence, evinces inconsistencies, at times admitting that it is just 
the “emotional and moral meanings” attached to the concept of the child to which she objects 
(Children’s Literature, 11), allowing her to speak unproblematically about “new-born or young 
human beings” (10), as though such signification had a more secure, material grounding. In this 
light, Lesnik-Oberstein sometimes comes closer to Nodelman and others, and therefore risks 
Cocks’ accusation that she too invokes some “indisputable and immutable ‘real’” (112). Yet, 
elsewhere, Lesnik-Oberstein is more dismissive, maintaining, as quoted earlier, that “the child 
does not exist” (9).  
 
However, this claim, too, raises problems for, unlike Rose, Lesnik-Oberstein takes a more textual 
stance in which “the child” exists only as half of that binary opposition, child-adult. In seeking to 
deconstruct the former part, then, the latter (the adult) is necessarily implicated. Yet this latter 
figure remains unproblematic for Lesnik-Oberstein, being allowed far more agency in “defining 
and discussing the nature of children” and in “expressing, formulating, and projecting ideals and 
ideas about themselves and the not-themselves [sic]” (25). Children, in contrast, “have no such 
voice” (26). It is difficult to see how a constructionist stance can permit such categorical 
essentialism, privileging agentic adults over voiceless children. It is certainly a long way from 
the poststructuralism of Foucault, for whom, more discursively, “power is exercised rather than 
possessed; it is not the ‘privilege’, acquired or preserved, of the dominant class”; moreover, it 
can be “manifested and sometimes extended by the position of those who are dominated” 
(Discipline, 26-7). Lesnik-Oberstein’s approach also seems somewhat distant from Derrida’s 
own notion of deconstruction, which is far more nuanced in dismantling binary oppositions, 
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always undertaken, in Derrida’s own words, with “affirmative exigency” rather than a “critical 
dogmatics” (Points, 54). 
 
Even more problematically, having rejected children’s literature criticism outright (towards the 
end of her book), Lesnik-Oberstein then considers how psychoanalysis might help foster a more 
authentic dialogue with a child, drawing not on poststructuralist practitioners, as one might 
expect (e.g. Lacan, Kristeva), but more humanistic, object-relations analysts. Interestingly, 
Foucault does make one appearance here, but it is from his early work, Madness and 
Civilization, where he, too, briefly entertained the possibility of capturing an authentic voice – in 
his case, that of the insane rather than the child – before moving towards a more emphatically 
anti-foundationalist, discursive stance.4  
 
Of course, children’s literature critics largely rejected Lesnik-Oberstein’s negative prognosis, 
though often with combative rhetoric rather than argument, again inhibiting a more productive 
dialogue. It also needs to be noted that Rose herself did not enter this “warzone,” so we don’t 
know her reaction, say, to Lesnik-Oberstein’s accusation that she, Rose, constructed “a ‘child’ 
for her own use and purposes: a Freudian unconscious child” (160); or, indeed, Rose’s view of 
Lesnik-Oberstein’s own attempt, using psychoanalysis, to establish a more authentic dialogue 
with a child. This would be a particularly valuable “difference” to explore, given that Lesnik-
Oberstein does not follow Rose’s more linguistic (Lacanian) reading of Freud but instead draws 
on, arguably, “the wrong Freud” of D.W. Winnicott and others.5 (For that commemorative issue 
on Rose’s work [Rudd and Pavlik], both Rose and Lesnik-Oberstein were encouraged to 
participate, but the latter felt she had nothing more to add to the debate.) 
 
Moving on to Lesnik-Oberstein’s Reading colleagues, Cocks and Walsh, their “critical 
dogmatics” are, if anything, more exacting and, I would argue, less Derridean as a consequence. 
Walsh’s often excellent monograph on Rudyard Kipling thus loses focus as she chastises other 
“poststructuralists” for their extra-discursive solecisms: Edward Said (11, 34, 38-9), Bart Moore-
Gilbert (13-14, 38-9) and finally Gayatri Spivak (36) – translator of Derrida’s Of Grammatology 
– are each taken to task, despite their differing agendas (Said, in particular, remained committed 
to some notion of agency, similar to that which Lesnik-Oberstein seems to grant adult figures). 
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But even if one forgives the “dogmatics,” I would argue that Derrida’s nuanced approach has 
been more seriously compromised. For, despite the fact that he is often seen as a key proponent 
of the “linguistic turn” in theory, Derrida actually saw his work as “a protest” against such 
“logocentrism” (“I Have a Taste for the Secret,” 76). In practice, rather than simply dismissing 
what was extra-textual (as his infamous quotation, above, is often taken to imply), Derrida 
continually worried about that “line of demarcation between a text and what is outside it” 
(“Living On,” 67), confessing to the tension he experienced in desiring an impossible “living 
speech, presence itself” while being compelled, philosophically, to “write exactly the opposite” 
(The Post Card, 194). He explicitly clarifies that mantra, “there is nothing outside the text,” in 
Limited Inc, arguing that it 
does not mean that all referents are suspended, denied or enclosed in a book, as people 
have claimed, or have been naïve enough to believe and to have accused me of believing. 
But it does mean … that one cannot refer to this “real” except in an interpretive 
experience. (148) 
In other words, the child is not discursive only (a mere construction), albeit one must inevitably 
depict the child through discourse. To collapse everything into discourse then, loses precisely 
these separable levels: the referents that are extra-discursive (literally, existing outside the text), 
albeit accessible only through text. Derrida’s use of the word “interpretive” is particularly 
salutary, gesturing towards an underlying “real,” whereas that more popularized term, 
“construction,” suggests something free-floating: an invention, ex nihilo. 
Derrida also addresses this problematic “demarcation” between the textual and the extra-textual 
in a late work on animals, where, with “words from the heart” (“The Animal,” 369), he 
challenges – using such loaded words as “genocide,” “hell” and “torture” – the way that humans 
and animals are discursively situated, striving to reach beyond any idle signification and plead 
for a “fundamental compassion” towards “beasts” (395). At one point he thus speaks about the 
disturbing gaze of an “actual” cat before which he stands naked, “like a child,” as he puts it 
(381): “I must make it clear from the start, the cat I am talking about is a real cat, truly, believe 
me, a little cat. It isn’t the figure of a cat” (374; italics in original). Here Derrida struggles to 
delineate a material feline, standing beyond mere “constructions of it.” This last phrase, though, 
is not Derrida’s; rather, I have borrowed it from Walsh. For it is ironic that in her essay, 
13 
 
“Animal/Child – It’s the Real Thing,” Walsh seeks to override this very distinction, drawing a 
parallel between the way that children’s literature critics refer to the “real” child and how writers 
on animals speak about “living animals, ‘real’ animals.” She objects to the idea “that there is 
after all a ‘real’ that could be distinguishable from constructions of it”; for her, there “must in the 
end be (only) construction” (152-3).6 Once again, Derrida’s careful distinction (above) is 
overridden, although one might surmise that a larger member of the cat family – a lion, perhaps –
could quite swiftly score an extra-discursive point, even though reports of such an outcome 
might be rendered in language only: Human undergoes deconstruction (i.e. erasure) in face of 
lion.7 
Flippancy aside, Derrida was not opposed to scientific “‘objectivity,’ … in which,” he declared, 
“I firmly believe” (Limited Inc, 136) – contrary to how he is depicted in the Sokal Hoax. In his 
essay on animals, Derrida is certainly careful to recognize various taxonomic distinctions (“the 
lizard from the dog, the protozoon from the dolphin,” etc. [402]), in order to move away from 
some homogeneous “animal,” which is as reductive a construction as that homogeneous “child.” 
He would certainly appreciate the difference between stating that “the child does not exist” and 
“the unicorn does not exist,” just as Rose can quite legitimately distinguish between “the child 
inside the book” and the one “outside” that “does not come so easily within its grasp” (2). 
 
So, whilst I would want to exonerate Derrida from Terry Eagleton’s claim that “deconstruction is 
able to outflank every existing knowledge to absolutely no effect …it cancels all the way through 
and leaves everything just as it was” (Function, 103-4), it is a statement that characterizes some, 
less subtle, poststructuralist engagements with Derrida’s work.  
 
It is certainly interesting to see how, in the wake of the theory wars, disaffection with a bland 
textualism began to spread. Toril Moi, for example, reflecting on her earlier Sexual/Textual 
Politics (1985), laments how poststructuralism, despite its promise of avoiding essentialism, 
ended up providing only rather abstract discursive constructions “without delivering the 
concrete, situated, and materialist understanding of the body” (What Is a Woman?, 31). Michèle 
Barrett likewise, reacting to what she terms an “aggressive anti-humanism,” recommends a more 
“agnostic” approach, one that is less exclusive of “art, religion, pleasure, the emotions, the 




I would add children’s literature to this list, so it is with some relief that Lesnik-Oberstein’s 
vision of a cleansed world, where “children’s literature criticism is disposed of” (167), has not 
come to pass. Revisiting Nodelman’s analogy, one would have to say that the Bush-like weapons 
of mass destruction she thought stockpiled against the discipline turned out to be rather 
overestimated. Nor, indeed, has “everything” been left “just as it was,” as Eagleton put it, for, 
some twenty years on, the area has expanded hugely in terms of its critical output, losing its 
Swiss (or ghetto) status as it attracts an increasing range of mainstream critics (e.g., J. Hillis 
Miller, Linda Hutcheon, Seth Lerer, Maria Tatar, Paul Wake and Marina Warner).  
 
In retrospect, then, Lesnik-Oberstein’s rather hubristic declaration, “the child does not exist” (9), 
needs to be set alongside other, grand battle cries from the time of the Theory Wars: Lacan’s 
declaration that “woman … does not exist” (Feminine Sexuality, 144-5), Eagleton’s “literature 
does not exist’ (Literary Theory, 16) and, finally, Foucault’s epitaph for the human being more 
generally, erased “like a face drawn in sand” (Order of Things, 387). Certainly, the idea of a 
“transcendental signified” lying behind any of these terms needed challenging, but attempts to 
dismantle any such signified completely, arguing that discourse was all, were hardly likely to 
prevail, let alone likely to dispose of such long-established “constructions” as the child and, 
indeed, literature itself, which have a material substrate held in place by a number of powerful 
ISAs – in which “children’s literature” as a field of study itself plays its part.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
I have argued that, during the period of the Theory Wars, a more fruitful theoretical debate was 
inhibited by a closing of ranks between what came to be seen as two respective “camps” and, as 
a consequence, was often fought between straw figures. This resulted in crucial differences 
between the respective positions being lost; and particularly, as I have tried to show, the 
theoretical distance between Rose and Lesnik-Oberstein, who have, almost without exception by 
commentators, been lumped together as “social constructionists.” As I have also suggested, this 
popular phrase itself conceals what might more fruitfully be seen not as “construction” (like the 
unicorn) but as “interpretation,” in line with Derrida’s own acknowledgement of a distinction 
between the “real” and language’s conceptualization of it. It is this distinction that the more 
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radical Reading critics, Cocks and Walsh, explicitly seek to erase, denying things (and 
particularly the child) any “pre- or extra-discursive existence” (Kipling, 38). 
 
However, despite the linguistic turn often being seen as something of an invasion (vide 
Alderson), it has in many ways proved fruitful – just as the Pythons credited the Romans – and 
its insights have informed many critics in the area: Clare Bradford, Karen Coats, Peter Hunt, Rod 
McGillis, Maria Nikolajeva, Perry Nodelman, Kimberley Reynolds, John Stephens, Roberta 
Seelinger Trites and Jack Zipes (among others), making most of us more wary about seeking to 
delineate that polysemic being, the child.  
 
The period of the Theory Wars is now behind us and, as noted above, rather than being 
“disposed of” (a metaphor I have not probed), the discipline of children’s literature studies is 
flourishing as never before. Nor did theory itself “end” – despite some titular claims (e.g. 
Cunningham’s Reading after Theory, where theorists are summarily dismissed as “bad readers,” 
59). Rather, as usually happens in such disputes, it moved on. Richard Bradford neatly sums up 
this shift, echoing the words of Moi and Barrett, above:  
The new approaches no longer carry the burden of having to prove that all metaphysical 
identities cancel themselves through never being able to fully control the semiotic sphere 
from which they derive. Instead, they want to address the question of how such 
constructions positively function and how they can acquire the power of social and 
technical reality principles in spite of their basically unstable status. (“Introduction,” 2) 
What has happened is that theory has become less hieratic and more eclectic, with children’s 
literature criticism itself showing a healthy engagement with recent developments (progressing 
via “contraries,” one might say), extending from the philosophical, via the rather arrogantly 
named “theory of mind,” to more fine-tuned studies (e.g., works by Clémentine Beauvais, Peter 
Costello, Marah Gubar, Maria Nikolajeva, and Perry Nodelman). 
 
With hindsight, it does seem a shame that the period of the Theory Wars was so exercised by the 
generally sterile debate detailed above, rather than engaging more productively with other areas 
of the then burgeoning field of cultural studies. Much of this latter work did maintain the crucial 
dialectic interplay between ideas and material culture to which Bradford alludes, often involving 
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some sort of empirical engagement. The stage for this was set (in the UK) by the innovative 
courses established by the Open University and Birmingham’s Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies, resulting in exciting work by, for instance, Martin Barker, Bronwyn Davies, Donald Fry, 
Henry Jenkins, Angela McRobbie, Charles Sarland, Caroline Steedman, Valerie Walkerdine, and 
Paul Willis, all of which managed to involve either children or young adults.  
 
Whilst empirical work is not obligatory, it certainly helps ensure that theory is concretely 
grounded and aware of the social context within which it operates (including the powerful 
influence of the various ISAs). In children’s literature studies this seems particularly important, 
given that it often seeks to speak for the child reader, however distorted or controlled that voice 
might be (as, of course, is everyone’s within the Symbolic). For surely, to proclaim that unlike 
adults, “[c]hildren … have no such voice” is an admission of methodological inadequacy– as the 
uncovering of previously muted voices, like those of women and the working class, has shown – 
not ontological fact. To accept that things could be otherwise would, ironically, underwrite a 
Romantic conception of the child as a being that stands outside society, asocial and somehow 
beyond discursive reach. 
 
Mention of the Romantic child brings us back, fortuitously, to Switzerland, for not only was this 
the birthplace of Rousseau and Piaget, but also of two of the most famous exemplars of the 
Romantic child: the boy, Émile and the girl, Heidi. Of course, Derrida would later point up the 
indeterminacies and contradictions in many of Rousseau’s texts, highlighting the impossibility of 
capturing any unmediated “child.”8 But, as Derrida also laments, “once quotation marks demand 
to appear, they don’t know where to stop” (“Living On,” 63). So, while theorizing involves 
exactly this reflection on the taken-for-granted – putting things on stage, spot-lit – a glut of scare 
quotes can also, as we have seen, reduce theory to stasis, with verbs becoming nouns, and the 
result becomes little more than a facile stand-off.  
 
Children’s literature’s relative independence has proved a boon here, even if it has occasionally 
seemed marginalized in terms of English studies. For, like Switzerland, children’s literature also 
exists on the margins of a number of other areas, perhaps especially advantageous in these days 
when the Humanities – including the study of English – have found themselves increasingly 
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under threat from far more dangerous, profit-driven enemies than the Theory Wars ever conjured 
up. Consequently, children’s literature’s allegiances with Librarianship, Literacy, Creative 
Writing and Early Years at one end, and with Youth, Media and Film studies at the other, have 
proven most valuable.  
 
Generally, then, children’s literature studies has shown the advantages of ecumenicism (q.v. 
Wolf et al. Handbook), of being healthily eclectic and tolerant while avoiding calcification. Seen 
in these terms, it might be better to move away from metaphors of territory altogether, and 
engage in what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari call “deterritorialization.” Such a notion is 
wittily captured in Diana Wynne Jones’ Howl’s Moving Castle, where that normally static, 
bellicose structure is shown to be more effective when it is mobile and agile, acting, in Rod 
McGillis’s felicitous phrase, like a “nimble reader.” 
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